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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 09-3128 
___________ 
 
CARLEN URIEL HIGGS, 
AKA  Cardel Higgs, 
AKA Cordell Dayes, 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
   Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. 046-018-938) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 24, 2011 
Before:  FUENTES, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Opinion filed August 25, 2011) 
2 
 
Thomas S. Jones, Esq. 
Ryan M. Christian, Esq. 
Alison M. Kilmartin, Esq. 
Jones Day 
500 Grant Street, Suite 4500 
Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
  Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Kate Balaban, Esq. 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
  Counsel for Respondent 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
Fuentes, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Carlen Higgs is the subject of a final order of removal 
from the United States issued by an Immigration Judge.  
Higgs filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) incorrectly identifying the 
appeal as one from an interlocutory ruling, rather than from a 
final order of removal.  As a result, the Board dismissed 
Higgs‟s appeal as moot.  Higgs filed the instant petition for 
review, challenging the Board‟s dismissal of his notice of 
appeal, the merits of the IJ‟s decision, and the enforceability 
of the order of removal. 
3 
 
 For the reasons below, we conclude the Board‟s order 
is a “final order” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) 
and that the Board erred by failing to liberally construe 
Higgs‟s petition for review.  We will therefore grant Higgs‟s 
petition for review and remand to the BIA for further 
proceedings. 
 
I. 
 
 Carlen Higgs was born in the Bahamas in 1981 and in 
1999 was lawfully admitted into the United States as a 
permanent resident.  In 2005, Higgs was charged with 
possession of and intent to deliver marijuana, in violation of 
Pennsylvania law 35 Pa. Con. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30), and 
knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance, 
in violation of 35 Pa. Con. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16).  Three 
years later, the Government sought to remove Higgs under 
two provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act 
(“INA”).  Under the INA, the Government “has the burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the 
alien is deportable.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A).  The 
Government also sought removal pursuant to INA § 
237(a)(2)(B)(i) which states: 
 
Any alien who at any time after admission has 
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy 
or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a 
State [or] the United States . . . relating to a 
controlled substance (as defined in section 802 
of Title 21), other than a single offense 
involving possession for one‟s own use of 30 
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.  
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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  In addition, the Government 
also invoked INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), which authorizes 
removal of “[a]ny alien . . . convicted of an aggravated 
felony.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 
 
 Represented by counsel, Higgs contested his removal 
on the ground that his prior convictions did not satisfy either 
provision.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) agreed, finding that 
Higgs sustained only a conviction for possession of marijuana 
and thus was not removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).  
After examining the state trial testimony, the IJ also found 
that Higgs was not removable under subsection (B)(i) because 
he possessed less than 30 grams of marijuana.  On November 
13, 2008, the IJ issued an order terminating the removal 
proceedings against Higgs.   
 
 The Government moved for reconsideration, and on 
November 24, 2008 the IJ granted the motion.  In so ruling, 
the IJ explained that he had misunderstood the arresting 
officer‟s trial testimony, and that in fact, he testified that 
Higgs was arrested “with 38 bags of marijuana containing 
between .83 grams and 2 grams.”  A.R. 114.1  Therefore, 
Higgs was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i).  Higgs 
then moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial 
testimony was “vague and confusing” and did not “establish 
the exact amount of marijuana.”  A.R. at 79. 
 
 On February 4, 2009, the IJ issued a third order, 
described as an “interlocutory ruling,” noting the uncertainty 
regarding the weight of the marijuana attributable to Higgs.  
                                                 
1
 “A.R” refers to the administrative record in this case. 
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Based on this uncertainty, the IJ ordered the Government “to 
obtain a copy of the property receipt” that itemized the seized 
marijuana, in the hopes that the receipt would conclusively 
prove the amount of marijuana at issue.  A.R. at 80.  The 
Government submitted the receipt, and on March 19, 2009, 
the IJ issued a fourth order, styled as an “Interlocutory Ruling 
on Motion,” finding in the Government‟s favor.  The IJ 
explained that: 
 
The trial transcript was certainly not the 
modicum of clarity.  A review of the chemistry 
report verifies the substance confiscated from 
[Higgs] as marijuana, but only verified a total 
amount of 15.77 grams of marijuana from five 
(5) separate baggies out of a total of 38 baggies 
found on [Higgs‟s] person. 
. . .  
[T]he court is constrained to concur with 
government counsel that there was no need for 
the laboratory to perform an analysis on all of 
the baggies once the marijuana was confirmed. . 
. . [O]ne may reasonably presume that the 
remainder of the baggies which were not tested 
by the laboratory also contained marijuana.  
That is, it stretches credulity to believe that only 
the 5 baggies chosen for random testing 
contained marijuana and the remainder might 
not have.  
 
A.R. at 61.  
  
 Thus the IJ concluded that Higgs possessed over 30 
grams of marijuana at the time of his arrest.  Following this 
6 
fourth ruling, the IJ issued a Final Order of Removal on May 
21, 2009.  This fifth, and last, order was purely administrative 
in nature and did not contain any reasoning or further 
explanation of the IJ‟s decision.  It also noted that Higgs was 
reserving his right to appeal, and that his notice of appeal was 
due by June 22, 2009. 
 
 On May 26, 2009, proceeding pro se,
2 
Higgs filed a 
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Emergency Stay of 
Removal.  In the section of the notice asking for the date of 
the “decision in a merits proceeding” being appealed, Higgs 
wrote “March-19-2009.”  A.R. at 6.  Higgs also identified 
three reasons for his appeal:  (1) the IJ‟s erroneous factual 
determination that Higgs possessed over 30 grams of 
marijuana, thus making him eligible for removal under INA § 
237(a)(2)(B)(i); (2) the need for clarification of the 
Government‟s burden under the “clear and convincing 
evidence” standard; and, relatedly, (3) clarification on the 
relationship between the government‟s burden of proof, the 
rule of lenity and the rule “granting presumption to [a]liens.”  
A.R. at 7. 
 
 Higgs‟s first notice of appeal was rejected by the BIA 
as non-compliant because the form lacked the necessary first 
page.  Higgs re-submitted his notice of appeal, but that appeal 
too was dismissed.  In its ruling—issued July 2, 2009—the 
BIA determined that, because Higgs‟s Notice of Appeal 
identified the IJ‟s March 19, 2009 interlocutory ruling as the 
subject of its appeal, the petitioner had “filed an interlocutory 
appeal.”  Noting that the basis for the interlocutory appeal had 
                                                 
2
 On May 21, 2009, Higgs‟s counsel successfully moved for 
permission to withdraw his representation. 
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been superceded by a final order of removal, the Board found 
Higgs‟s “interlocutory appeal [to be] moot” and dismissed it.  
A.R. at 2.   
 
 Higgs timely filed this petition for review.  He also 
sought a stay of the removal proceedings, which this Court 
granted.  In this petition for review, Higgs argues that the BIA 
erred in failing to construe his notice of appeal liberally.  As 
to the merits of his removal, Higgs first submits that the IJ 
erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence 
that he possessed more than 30 grams of marijuana and was 
therefore ineligible for removal pursuant to INA § 
237(a)(2)(B)(i).  Next, Higgs contends that the order 
removing him to the Bahamas cannot be enforced because, by 
operation of law, he is not a Bahamian citizen.
3
 
                                                 
3
 At the time he was born, Higgs‟s parents were not married.  
His mother was a Jamaican citizen and his father a citizen of 
the Bahamas.  Higgs wrote to the Embassy of the 
Commonwealth of the Bahamas inquiring about his 
citizenship status on July 22, 2009.  The Consul responded on 
July 29, 2009, informing him that: 
 
Under the constitution of the Bahamas, persons 
born after 10 July, 1973 in the Bahamas to a 
non-Bahamian single mother, may apply for 
Bahamian citizenship at the age of 18 and 
before their 19
th
 birthday.  Until such time as 
they apply for and are granted citizenship, such 
persons are deemed to have the nationality of 
their mother.   
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II. 
 
 The Government raises two challenges to our 
jurisdiction in this case, which we review de novo.  Hoxha v. 
Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Singh v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2004)).  In its motion to 
dismiss, the Government maintains that we lack jurisdiction 
over this petition because the BIA‟s order of dismissal is not a 
“final order” within Section 1252(a)(1) because it “did not 
adjudicate [Higgs‟s] removability” and did not “affirm the . . . 
May 21, 2009 decision, which was the final order of removal 
in the instant case.”  Gov‟t Mot. Dismiss at 4.  In addition, the 
Government contends that we lack jurisdiction because Higgs 
has not exhausted his administrative remedies.  We disagree.  
 
 Our jurisdiction to review a final order of removal is 
set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Under that provision, we 
may review only “a final order of removal.”  Id. (emphasis 
added); see also Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 247 
(3d Cir. 2008).  We have taken a broad view of what 
constitutes a “final order of removal” under Section 1252.  In 
Yusupov v. Attorney General, we stated our “agree[ment] 
with” the decisions of “several of our sister circuit courts of 
appeals . . . conclud[ing] that an order is final for 
jurisdictional purposes when a removability determination 
has been made that is no longer appealable to the BIA, 
                                                                                                             
Since you did not apply for citizenship under 
the terms mentioned, you are not a Bahamian 
citizen . . . . 
 
Pet. Ex. A. 
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regardless [of] whether a formal order of removal has been 
entered.”  518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Shehu v. 
Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2007) (“denial of a . . . 
petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under 
the [Convention Against Torture] constitutes „a final order of 
removal‟ within the meaning of [section 1252], [because] the 
alien is entitled to no further process before deportation”).   
 
 In Khouzam, we found an agency action that made the 
deportation of an alien a certainty constituted a final order of 
removal.  549 F.3d at 247.  In that case, following a ruling by 
the Second Circuit granting the petitioner a “deferral of 
removal,” the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
“decided to terminate the deferral of removal.”  Id.  As a 
result, the petitioner became “eligible for, and apparently 
subject to, imminent removal to Egypt.”  Id.  Applying the 
“common sense application of the term‟s plain meaning,” we 
found that DHS‟s decision was appealable because the 
petitioner was arrested and detained and “was going to be 
removed, and that was final.”  Id. at 248-49. 
 
 Therefore, the Government‟s argument that only an 
order affirming the IJ or adjudicating Higgs‟s removal is a 
“final order of removal” under Section 1252 is not supported 
by our case law.  In this case, the IJ came to the conclusion 
that Higgs was deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) 
because he possessed more than 30 grams of marijuana.  The 
IJ then issued a separate, final order of removal.  The BIA 
never reviewed that order, having concluded that Higgs was 
appealing from a different order.  Therefore, the IJ‟s final 
order of removal still stands, and the Board‟s July 2 order 
which mooted Higgs‟s appeal has the same effect as an order 
of removal.  
10 
 
 There is also little doubt that the BIA‟s July 2 order is 
“final.”  The time for Higgs to remedy the error and properly 
appeal from the fifth, and “dispositive,” order has passed.  As 
a result, Higgs has no other administrative recourse to 
challenge his removability and is “entitled to no further 
process before deportation.” 4  Shehu, 482 F.3d at 656. The 
short of it is that “[Higgs] [i]s going to be removed, and that 
[i]s final.”  Khouzam, 549 F.3d at 248. 
 
 The Government‟s second argument—that we lack 
jurisdiction because Higgs has failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies—is also unavailing.  To the extent 
the Government‟s position is premised on the contention that, 
because Higgs appealed only the interlocutory order and not 
the final order of removal, he did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies, this argument fails because, as we 
conclude below, the BIA erred in its reading of Higgs‟s notice 
of appeal.  Moreover, Higgs‟s notice of appeal—which 
unequivocally stated the reasons for his appeal, including the 
factual and legal errors committed by the BIA—clearly 
complied with the principle that a petitioner has satisfied his 
administrative remedies if he made “some effort, however 
insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward 
issue being raised on appeal.”  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 
                                                 
4
 Higgs states in his brief that “by the time the BIA dismissed 
his [Notice of] Appeal, the time to re-file an appeal of [the 
final order of removal] had been expired for eleven days.”  
Pet. Br. at 21.  Therefore he has “no further means of 
administrative redress.”  Pet. Br. at 21.  The Government does 
not contend otherwise. 
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114, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 
123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006)).
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 For these reasons, we conclude that we have 
jurisdiction over Higgs‟s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. § 
1252. 
 
III. 
 
 We now turn to the heart of Higgs‟s claim on appeal, 
that the BIA erred in failing to construe his notice of appeal 
as seeking review of the IJ‟s final order of removal.  The 
Government contends that the Board had no obligation to 
liberally construe Higgs‟s notice of appeal and thus that his 
appeal was properly dismissed. 
 
A. 
 
 In failing to afford Higgs a liberal construction of his 
notice of appeal, the BIA erred.
6
  The obligation to liberally 
                                                 
5
 The Government also argues that the claim that Higgs is not 
a Bahamanian citizen is unexhausted because it was never 
presented to the IJ or to the BIA at all.  Because we decline to 
reach the merits of this claim, the Board will have an 
opportunity to consider it for the first time on remand, thus 
allowing Higgs to properly exhaust this claim.  We note, 
however, that Higgs only learned that he was not a Bahamian 
citizen after he had filed his notice, and thus, he was unable to 
raise that issue in his notice of appeal. 
 
6
 Whether the Board applied the wrong standard in construing 
petitioner‟s notice of appeal is a question of law that we 
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construe a pro se litigant‟s pleadings is well-established.  
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Capogrosso v. The 
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“[W]e remain mindful of our obligation to construe a 
pro se litigant‟s pleadings liberally.”) (citing Haines, 404 
U.S. at 520-21).  This Court‟s jurisprudence has avoided 
formalism “in favor of a contextual approach that construes 
appeal notices liberally, especially in cases that, like this one, 
involve pro se appellants.”  Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 
634 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Tabron v. Grace, 6 
F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “we have 
traditionally given pro se litigants greater leeway where they 
have not followed the technical rules of pleading and 
procedure”).  Our policy of liberally construing pro se 
submissions is “driven by the understanding that „[i]mplicit in 
the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of 
the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se 
litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights 
because of their lack of legal training.‟”  Triestman v. Fed. 
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
 
 In support for its argument that the BIA does not have 
an obligation to liberally construe pro se petitioners‟ notices 
of appeal, the Government directs us to the practical obstacles 
of doing so.  The Government maintains that it is 
“unreasonable” to expect the Board to “read between the 
lines” of a notice of appeal, given the number of cases the 
Board reviews.  Gov‟t Br. 13.  In addition, the Government 
                                                                                                             
review de novo.  Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 94 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2006).  
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argues that because Higgs had a right to file an interlocutory 
appeal with the Board, “there was no reason for the Board to 
have known or surmised that the Petitioner intended to do 
something” else—that is, appeal the final order rather than the 
interlocutory order.  Gov‟t Br. 12-13. 
 
 Neither of these arguments is persuasive.  We have 
never held that, because it is difficult to interpret a pro se 
litigant‟s pleadings, it is not necessary to do so.  Rather, when 
presented with a pro se litigant, we “have a special obligation 
to construe his complaint liberally.”  United States v. Miller, 
197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Zilich v. Lucht, 
981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir. 1992)).  The Government‟s 
argument runs counter to the principles underpinning the 
policy of liberally construing pro se admissions.  There is no 
question that pro se pleadings present particular challenges.  
See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve 
Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the 
Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30 
Fordham Urb. L. J. 305, 308 (2002) (“Court personnel 
reviewing pro se pleadings are charged with the responsibility 
of deciphering why the submission was filed, what the litigant 
is seeking, and what claims she may be making.  This task is 
particularly difficult because the submission may be rambling 
and illogical, if not completely illegible.”). 
 
 These difficulties are compounded in the immigration 
system.  Pro se pleadings are often submitted by individuals 
with limited skills and technical expertise in the law.  See 
Lurana S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 St. 
Thomas L. Rev. 295, 301 (1997) (noting that “[m]any [pro se 
litigants are] illiterate, most are unschooled in the law, and 
some are in need of mental health counseling”) (quoting 
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conference members at Judicial Conference of the U.S., Long 
Range Plan for the Federal Courts 65 (1995)).  In immigration 
cases, pro se pleadings are often written by individuals with 
limited fluency in English.  See Robert A. Katzmann, The 
Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant 
Poor, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 3, 9-10 (2008) (“An immigrant 
often has limited fluency with the English language . . . . An 
immigrant who appears pro se or does not have the benefit of 
adequate counsel will be at a disadvantage in such 
proceedings.”).  Moreover, the law itself is complicated and 
difficult to navigate.  See Baltazar-Alcazar v. I.N.S., 386 F.3d 
940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“With only a small degree of 
hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed second 
only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity.  A lawyer is 
often the only person who could thread the labyrinth.”); see 
also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 277 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(“[C]ross-cultural misunderstandings about the veracity of 
petitioners‟ testimony can be exacerbated by difficulty 
understanding the procedure and structure of immigration 
proceedings.”). 
 
 But if anything, the intricacy of this legal system 
accentuates the need to liberally construe pro se submissions 
or immigration petitioners.  Like other administrative 
systems, the immigration system “must be accessible to 
individuals who have no detailed knowledge of the relevant 
statutory mechanisms and agency processes.”  Fed. Express 
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008).  The 
obligation to construe these pleadings liberally—no matter 
how difficult the “practical reality of administrative 
practice”—must be taken seriously. 
 
B. 
15 
 
 Had the Board applied this principle to Higgs‟s notice 
of appeal, several aspects of the notice would have revealed 
that Higgs was in fact seeking review of the May 21 final 
order of removal. 
 
 First, although Higgs wrote in his notice of appeal that 
he was appealing the IJ‟s “March-19-2009” decision, his 
statement of the reasons for the appeal made it clear that what 
he wanted was for the BIA to review the determination that 
he was removable.  Higgs explained that the reasons for his 
appeal were, inter alia, (1) “the need to review a clearly 
erroneous factual determination . . . where [Higgs] . . . did not 
possess over 30 grams[,] which [INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)] 
clearly exclude[s] for deportation purposes,” and (2) whether 
the Government met its burden of proof by proving the 
ground for removal by clear and convincing evidence.  A. R. 
7.  In addition, the addendum Higgs attached stated that he 
“[wa]s not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(b)(i) of the 
Immigration and [N]ationality [A]ct, and has not committed 
[a] deportable offense because the respondent State 
conviction presentence report does not verify marijuana to 
weigh over 30 grams.”  A.R. at 11.  Thus, although Higgs 
identified the March 19 interlocutory ruling as the subject of 
his notice of appeal, the substance of his submission revealed 
that Higgs was challenging the IJ‟s determination that he was 
removable. 
 
 Second, the timing of Higgs‟s filing of his notice of 
appeal also demonstrates that Higgs sought review of the May 
21 final order of removal.  Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(2), an 
appeal must be filed with the BIA “within 30 days of the 
service of the decision being appealed.”  Higgs‟s notice of 
16 
appeal was therefore untimely as to the March 19 decision, 
but it was timely as to the May 21 final order of removal, and 
was filed only five days after the final order of removal was 
issued.  The temporal proximity between Higgs‟s appeal and 
the final order of removal issued against him, in light of the 
notice‟s untimeliness as to the fourth interlocutory ruling, 
should have alerted the BIA to the fact that Higgs sought an 
appeal from that actual removal order, and not the 
interlocutory ruling issued sixty-eight days earlier.  Cf. Mills, 
634 F.3d at 753 (noting that because defendant had already 
“completed service of the sentence he received” on an earlier 
assault conviction and “had just been convicted in [a new] 
murder case” offense . . . the government should have known 
that [the defendant] was appealing the murder conviction, not 
the dusty old assault conviction”). 
 
 Third, given the BIA‟s own policy disfavoring 
interlocutory appeals, it would have made sense for the BIA 
to construe Higgs‟s notice of appeal as challenging the final 
order of removal.  The BIA‟s Practice Manual states: “The 
Board does not normally entertain interlocutory appeals and 
generally limits interlocutory appeals to instances involving 
either important jurisdictional questions regarding the 
administration of the immigration laws or recurring questions 
in the handling of cases by Immigration Judges.”  BIA 
Practice Manual § 4.14(c).  Therefore, it would seem 
anomalous for the BIA to designate Higgs‟s notice of appeal 
as an interlocutory appeal and rule that it is moot, particularly 
since Higgs did not write “interlocutory appeal” on his notice 
of appeal, as the Practice Manual commands.  BIA Practice 
Manual § 4.14(d) (“Next to the words „What decision are you 
appealing?‟ in box 5, type or write in the words 
„INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.‟”). 
17 
 
 Finally, given the nature of the two orders at issue, it is 
understandable that Higgs erroneously identified the earlier 
ruling as the subject of his appeal.  Only the March 19 
interlocutory ruling contained an explanation of the IJ‟s 
determination that Higgs was removable.  That order 
concluded that “the government ha[d] met its burden of proof 
by clear and convincing evidence” of a violation under INA § 
237(a)(2)(B)(i).  The May 21 final order of removal, on the 
other hand, is a one-page administrative order that contains 
no explanation of the IJ‟s decision.  Thus, we find it 
understandable that a layperson such as Higgs, who was 
challenging the merits of the IJ‟s determination that the 
evidence showed that he possessed more than 30 grams of 
marijuana, would identify the order setting forth that 
determination, rather than the administrative order enforcing 
that decision. 
 
IV. 
 
 In conclusion, while the circumstances of Higgs‟s 
notice of appeal demonstrate that he intended to appeal from 
the final order of removal issued on May 21, 2009, the Board 
never reached the merits of his appeal.  Therefore, consistent 
with our policy that an “agency is given an opportunity to 
resolve issues raised before it prior to any judicial 
intervention,” Hoxha, 559 F.3d at 163, we will remand this 
case to the BIA for further proceedings to consider Higgs‟s 
remaining two claims, that the IJ erred in finding that there 
was clear and convincing evidence that he possessed more 
than 30 grams of marijuana and that the final order of 
removal is unenforceable because of his citizenship status. 
